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fOOD. DRUG. AND COSMETIC LAW 
FREDERICK l\f:. HART 
THE Food Additive Amendment of 1958 clearly stands out as the principal legislative achievement during the S11rvey period, while 
the Supreme Court's decision in the Florida Citrns case offers the 
most important judicial development. 
I 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION1 
Food Additives Amendment of 1958.-Characterized as "the 
most important advance of our national pure food law, in its entire 
history,"2 the· Food Additive Amendment of 19583 is the result of 
over seven years of legislative investigation, hearings, and debate.4 
Essentially, the amendment requires pretesting by industry of po-
tentially unsafe food additives before their use. 
When the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938:1 was 
passed, no specific provisions were included regulating food additives 
either than coal-tar colors.6 Most additives used at that time had been 
long recognized as safe and suitable for use in food, and scientific 
e~perimentation had not as yet demonstrated the harmful effects pos-
sible from some of these apparently innocuous added substances. 
During and subsequent to World War IT, however, amazing progress 
was made by the food and chemical industries in developing anti-
oxidants, emulsifiers, stabilizers, preservatives, flavors, and other ad-
ditives designed to better foods. Concurrent to this development, 
improved scientific testing methods and greater scientific knowledge 
cast doubt upon the safety of certain food additives.T 
F.rederick M. Hart is Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Food Law 
~rogram at 1'1ew York University School of Law. He is a Member of the District of 
Columbia and New York Bars. 
1 For other recent enactments not discussed in the te.'tt see Li\'estock Marketing and 
Meat-Packing Industry Act, 72 Stat. 1749, 7 U.S.C.A. § 227 (Supp. 1958) (jurisdiction 
of Federal Trade Commission e."l:tended to stockyard activities) ; Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act, 72 Stat. 862, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1903-06 (Supp. 1958) (providing for human~ 
method of livestock slaughter). 
2 Dunn, Fundamental Progress of the Pure-Food Law, 13 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 
615, 616 (1958). 
3 72 Stat. 1784, 21 U.S.C.A. § 348 (Supp. 1958). 
4 See Kleinfeld, Congress Investigates Chemicals in Foods, 6 Food Drug Cosm. 
L.J. 120 _(1951). 
5 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1952). 
6 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C . .§ 342(c) (1952); 52 Stat. 1049 (1938), as 
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 346(b) (1952). 
7 See H.R. Rep. No. 2356, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953); H.R. Rep. No. 3254, 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1951). 
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Under the 1938 act, regulation of additives was possible only 
through the enforcement of provisions which prohibited the addition 
to food of any poisonous or deleterious substance except where it was 
unavoidable in good manufacturing practices. Where good manufac-
turing practices required the use of a toxic substance, the Food and 
Drug Administration was empowered to establish tolerances, setting 
the maximum amount of the additives which could be used.8 
This method of control was unsatisfactory for three reasons: 
( 1) it required the Government to prove affirmatively that the added 
substance was poisonous or deleterious, proof of which might require 
two years of scientific testing; (2) during this period of testing the 
manufacturer was permitted to continue using the product, and al-
lowed to off er it to consumers; and ( 3) the act, as interpreted, abso-
lutely prohibited any unnecessary poisonous or deleterious substance 
to be added, thus keeping from the market some additives which, al-
though toxic if taken in large quantities, might be used at safe levels 
to the advantage of the consumer. 
In general, the Food Additive Amendment follows the traditional 
administrative procedure. All additives which are not generally rec-
ognized among qualified experts to be safe under the conditions of 
intended use, or which are not within certain exempt classes, render 
a food adulterated9 unless there is in effect a regulation issued by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare prescribing the condi-
tions under which the additive may be safely used.10 Any person may 
file a petition proposing the issuance of such a regulation.11 In support 
of his application, adequate scientific evidence must be presented 
proving the additive safe under the intended conditions of use.12 
Within ninety days ( which time limit may be extended by the 
Secretary to a maximum of one hundred and eighty days), the Sec-
retary must promulgate an order ruling upon the petition.13 Up to 
s 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2) (1952); 52 Stat. 1049 (1938) 1 as 
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (1952). Some degree of regulation was also afforded by 
sections of the act providing for the standardization of foods. 52 Stat. 1046, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 341 (1952). See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ewing, 201 F.2d 347, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. 
L. Rep. U 7247 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 923 (1953); Lovell, Administrative 
Procedure in the Regulation of Food Additives: A Comparative Study, 11 Food Drug 
Cosm. L.J. 413 (1956). 
o 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 342(c) (1952). 
10 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(a) (Supp. 1958). 
11 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(b) (Supp. 1958). 
12 Although the Food and Drug Administration apparently will not foreclose the 
use of new tests to prove safety, the present method of testing requires extensive ex-
perimentation usually taking in excess of two years. See Lehman, Procedures for 
the Appraisal of the Toxicity of Chemicals in Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics, 10 Food 
Drug Cosm. L.J. 679 (1955). 
13 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(c) (Supp. 1958). 
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this point there is no hearing procedure available, but anyone who is 
adversely affected by the order may, within thirty days of its pro-
mulgation, file objections and request a hearing. H His request must 
be accompanied by a specification of the parts of the order to which 
he objects, and reasonable grounds for his objection. The Secretary 
is then required to hold a public hearing, after notice, for the purpose 
of receiving evidence relevant and material to the issues raised by the 
objections. At the completion of the hearing an order ruling upon 
the objections must be made, including detailed :findings of fact and 
conclusions.15 
This order is then subject to judicial review in the United States 
courts of appeal upon the petition of any adversely affected person. 
The scope of review to be applied by the court is indicated by the 
provision in the act that, "the findings of the Secretary with respect 
to questions of fact shall be sustained if based upon a fair evaluation 
of the entire record at such hearing.mo That Congress intentionally 
refrained from using the phrase "substantial evidence" in formulating 
the scope of judicial review is apparent from the legislative history of 
the amendment, wherein it is indicated that an attempt was made to 
establish other guideposts for the reviewing courts.17 Considering, 
however, the lack of success which judges have had in reducing the 
well-known "substantial evidence" test to a working formula, 18 it is 
unlikely that food additive regulations will receive any different re-
view from that given cases arising under statutes requiring an agency 
to base its determination upon substantial evidence. No matter how 
legislatures may phrase the "test" for sustaining agency action, judges 
will still be left with wide discretion, and will be greatly influenced by 
the character of the agency, the nature, consequences, and fairness of 
the initial ruling, and by their own competence to decide the issues 
raised. 
The legislative history of this amendment shows many instances 
of sharp disagreement among those most interested in its adoption. 
The Food and Drug Administration, consumer organizations, and 
industry representatives each sponsored and backed different schemes 
for governmental control in this field. The bill which was finally 
enacted into law is, in a sense, a compromise designed to satisfy, at 
least partially, each of these parties. However, in a more real sense, 
14 21 U.S.C.A. § 348{f) (Supp. 1958). 
15 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(£) (Supp. 1958). 
10 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(g) (Supp. 1958). 
11 S. Rep. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1958); Legislath-c ffistory of 1958 
Food Additives Amendment to Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 66 (Dunn ed. 
1958). 
18 See Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 
945 (1958). 
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it is an amalgamation of the best of the many suggestions offered. 
The result is a strong bill for consumer protection which gives broad 
powers to the Food and Drug Administration while still being con-
sistent with a philosophy of government which favors industry ini-
tiative and responsibility over governmental licensing. 
II 
MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION 
During the year New Yoi;k <;ity rewrote those provisions of its 
Health Code which regulate foods, drugs, and cosmetics.10 A part of 
a general revision of the code, these regulations are of special im-
portance due to the probability that they will become model provisions 
influencing other municipalities restudying the problem. A major 
objective of the revision was to conform the language of the local 
regulations to the applicable federal and state law in order to allow 
greater cooperation among enforcement officers, and to relieve indus-
try of the burden of having to comply with conflicting regulations. As 
a result, the New York, City regulations now closely follow the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, with the exception that the city has 
deleted all provisions aimed at economic fraud, on the rationale that 
this situation is more adequately handled by the state and federal gov-
ernment, and q.oes not constitute a health problem.20 
III 
CASES21 
Coal-Tar Colors.-In 1955 FD & C Red No. 32 was removed 
from the approved list of coal-tar colors by the Secretary of Health, 
10 New York City Health Code, tit. IV, arts. 70, 71, 111, 113, 
20 Introduction to 3d Draft of Articles 70, 71, 111 and 113 presented by Legislative 
Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University to The Board of Health of the City 
of New York (mimeo.). This draft was approved in principle by the board on October 
20, 1958. , . . 
21 Other cases decided since the 1957 Survey, but not discussed in the text, include: 
Marshall v. United States, 258 F.2d 94, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. ,r 7446 (10th 
Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 892 (1958) (actions by government agents held not to 
constitute en~rapment) ; United States v. Miller, 256 F.2d 89, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm, 
L. Rep. ,r 7442 (8th Cir. 1958) (writ of mandamus t9 compel district court to omit 
part of judgment denied) : United States v. 1500 Cases, More or Less, 249 F.2d 382 
(7th Cir. 1957) (pre-seizure storage charges not recoverable from federal. governmc"O; 
United States v. Rutstein, 163 F. Supp. 71, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm, L. Rep. U 7443 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (labelling requirement of § 407(b} held not to apply to ,vholes:ile 
packages); United States v. 42 Jars ... "Bee Royale Capsules ***," 160 F. Supp. 818, 
2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. II 7438 (D.N.J. 1958) (prior adjudication under 
postal fraud statute held not res judicata in seizure action) ; United States v. 3963 
Bottles, More or Less, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L, Rep. U 7460 (N.D. Ill. 1958) 
(agreement between claimant and Post Office Departm,ent in fraud action held not ap· 
plicable to seizure action) ; United States v. Delmar Pharmacal Corp., 2 CCI-1 Food 
Drug Cosm. L. Rep. 11 7456 (N.D.N.Y. 1958) (consent degree in injunction, action) ; 
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Education, and Welfare.22 The validity of this delisting order was 
sustained against a general attack by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit,23 but was set aside by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth -Circuit insofar as it removed certification of the color as harm-
1.e_ss and safe for external use on oranges.24 The Fifth Circuit, in a 
confusing opinion, held that the term "harmless11 in the statute2:1 was 
to be const~ed in a relative sense, and that the Secretary was required 
t-0 certify a color whenever it was harmless under the conditions of its 
intended use. The court also held that it was incumbent upon the 
Secretary to determine whether the color was necessary in good pro-
duction practices, .and if it were, he was required to promulgate tol-
erances within which the color could be safely used. 
Certi~rari was granted in the Fifth Circuit case, Folsom v. Flor-
ida _Citrus Exclzange,26 and the Supreme Court reversed.21 Con-
sidering the legislative history of. the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of 1938,28 the Court concluded that Congress, intending to 
treat coal-tar colors (which add only to the appearance of a food) 
with greater caution than other toxic ingredients, had dictated that 
"the test of. certification ... concentrates on the color substance itself 
[which] is to be listed only if it is harmless."20 In interpreting the key 
word "harmless," the Court said that "Congress may have intended 
'harmless' in a relative sense, but we think it was in relation to such 
labpratory tesu; [toxicological tests] as the ones the Secretary per-
formed."30 From _a literal reading .of the statute, the Court found 
no grounds for th~ contention that the Secretary is empowered to set 
tolerances for the use of coal-tar colors. 
It is likely that the opinion will result in legislation e.xtending 
the stay of the Secretary's order, effected by a congressional amend-
United States v. w; F. Morgan & Sons, 155 F. Supp. 40, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. 
Rep. U 7421 (E.D. Va. 1957) (proof insufficient to establish violation of oyster stand-
ards). 
- 22 20 Fed. Reg. 8492 (1955). For the present approved list see 21 C.F.R. ti 9.3 
(1955): ' 
23 Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Folsom, 236 F.2d 866, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. 
L. Rep. U 7367 (2d Cir. 1956). 
24 .Florida Citrus Exchange v. Folsom, 246 F.2d 850, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. 
L: Rep; U 7404 {5th Cir. 1957). 
- 25 52 Stat.-1049 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 346(b) (1952). 
26 356 U.S. 911 (1958). 
21 Fleming v. Florida Citrus Exchange, 358 U.S. 153, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. 
Rep. U 7468 (1958). 
28 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1952). 
29 358 U.S. at 162, 2 · CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. at p. 8603. For a fuller dis-
cussion of the circuit ·court opinions see 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 302, in 1957 Ann. Sur..-cy 
Am. L. 263 {1958), wherein it was stated, "the clear language of the stntutc contradicts 
the fifth circuit's interpretation. The section directs that the color must be safe, not 
the use to which it might be put." 
30 358 U.S. at 164, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. at p. 8604. 
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ment to the Act in 1956, specifically allowing the use of the color on 
oranges until April of 1959.31 
Physician's Dispensing Drugs Without A Prescription.-In 
Brown v. United States,32 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that the Durham-Humphrey Amendment33 to the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act34 applied to the sale of prescription drugs by 
a registered physician. Doctor Brown dispensed barbiturates in one 
thousand pill lots to federal agents posing as truck drivers, without 
giving them a prescription, or examining them to ascertain whether 
the use of these drugs was therapeutically indicated.· 
The court refused to ref er to the legislative history of the amend-
ment on the grounds that the law had been interpreted to be for the 
benefit of the public on several occasions by the Supreme Court.8G 
Literally construing the language of the statute to require a prescrip-
tion prior to the dispensing of drugs, even by a physician, the court 
found the trial judge's charge to the jury unobjectionable. The trial 
judge had charged that: 
... in determining whether he [defendant) dispensed the drugs ... on 
prescription, you may properly consider whether a doctor-patient rela-
tionship existed ... whether he considered the individual needs of the 
person to whom he dispensed the drug, the quantity of the drug dis· 
pensed and the manner in which he supervised the use of the drug.80 
This charge, the court felt, placed the doctor in a better position than 
he would be in if the statute were taken on its face. 
Although the court specifically held the charge correct, a close 
reading of the case gives the impression that the court actually held 
that whenever a physician dispenses drugs covered by section 503 (b )37 
of the act, he is technically violating the law. It is as difficult to con-
ceive that Congress intended such a result as it is to believe that a 
physician, by virtue of his being a physician, is to be allowed to 
engage in the uncontrolled retail sale of restricted drugs. The more 
realistic approach was taken by the trial court in instructing the 
jury that a physician is exempt from the act only so long as he acts 
as a medical doctor. 
Relabeling of Condemned Drugs.-The United States filed a 
31 70 Stat. 512 (1956), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 342(c) (Supp. V, 1958). 
32 250 F.2d 745, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. U 7425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
356 U.S. 938 (1958). 
33 65 Stat. 648 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1952). 
34 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1952). 
35 The court cited United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); United States 
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
36 250 F.2d at 747, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. at p. 8509. 
37 65 Stat. 648 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1952). 
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libel asking condemnation of a "skin conditioner" on the ground, 
inter alia, that the name of the preparation, "buticaps," caused it to 
be misbranded because it represented to the public that the product 
had a therapeutic effect, when in fact it did not. The claimant ad-
mitted. that the articles were misbranded on other grounds charged 
in the complaint, but denied the allegations as to the name. Judgment 
was given to the Government on the pleadings, but the court released 
the goods to the claimant for relabeling under the supervision of the 
Food and Drug Administration. Thereafter, the claimant moved for 
an order that since there had been no judicial determination that the 
name did not comply with the statute, they had the right to continue 
the use of this name. This motion was denied by the district court. 
The court of appeals, in Buticaps, Inc. v. United Statcs,38 reversed, 
holding that the terms and conditions of salvage are to be set by the 
court, not by the Food and Drug Administration, and that the failure 
of the court to give claimant a hearing on the issue would be a de-
privation of due process. 
Mu/.tiple Seizures of New Drugs.-Merritt Corp. v. Folsom:39 is 
interesting on two grounds. First, it held that multiple seizures may 
be instituted without the making of any probable cause determination 
under section 304.40 Secondly, the case furnishes the first judicial 
recognition that, "where there is a genuine difference of medical 
opinion among the experts on the question of whether a drug is gen-
erally recognized as safe for the treatment of a particular disease, it 
must be concluded that the drug is not generally recognized as safe for 
use in the treatment of that disease,"41 and that, hence, it is a new 
drug under section 20l(p).42 
38 252 F.2d 634, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. !I 7432 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Con~ 
United States v. 1322 Cans, More or Less, of Black Raspberry Puree, 68 F. Supp. SSL 
(N.D. Ohio 1946). 
39 165 F. Supp. 418, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. !I 7462 (D.D.C. 1958). 
40 52 Stat. 1044 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1952). 
41 165 F. Supp. at 421, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. at p. 8583. 
42 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 32l(p} (1952). 
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